Given the rapid growth of securitisation markets around the world, the Basle Committee acknowledged the importance of asset securitisation in regard as a coming structured finance funding tool for financial intermediaries by adopting a comprehensive regulatory policy for asset securitisation, which was to be deemed critical to a viable implementation of a revised Basle
Accord. Failure to do so would certainly miss the objectives of financial stability set out by the Prior to the Securitisation Framework, which will finally come into force in 2006, the Basle Committee had made several proposals and revisions for a consistent regulatory treatment of securitised exposures in response to feedback from banks and supervisory agencies.
The First Consultative Paper (see Fig. 1 
) released by the Securitisation Group of the Basle Committee in
June 1999, introduced a general securitisation proposal, which was later expanded upon in the Second Consultative Paper on securitisation in January 2001. At this stage, the drafting of common 1 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a steering group of all G10 member countries of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 2 For a general discourse on the rationale of banking regulation we refer readers to Benston and Kaufman (1996) as well as Besanko and Kanatas (1996) . regulatory policy focused primarily on the standardised treatment to traditional securitisation transactions, where banks were required to assign risk-weights to securitisation exposures based on few observable characteristics, such as an issue rating. However, it also presented an initial distinction of sponsoring and investing banks, revolving asset securitisation, cash advancement and liquidity facilities as well as risk transfer requirements for traditional securitisation.
After consultation with the industry and further analyses, the Basle Committee issued the First Working Paper on the Asset Securitisation, which comprised an in-depth internal-ratings based (IRB) treatment of securitisation exposures in addition to the standardised, "one-size-fits all" approach.
It also sought to initiate further consultation on a concrete treatment of synthetic securitisation, liquidity facilities and early amortisation features, which finally culminated in the Securitisation 
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Objective and structure
The following sections provide a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the 
THE PATHOLOGY OF THE SECURITISATION FRAMEWORK
The new Basle Accord and the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation
The revised version of the Basle Accord fundamentally rests on three regulatory pillars. In principle, the first pillar (Pillar 1, "Minimum Capital Requirements") is set for a similar tenor as the 1988 Basle Accord, which requires banks to meet minimum capital requirements for exposures to credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Banks are permitted to use either one of the following approaches to the computation of regulatory capital: the standard approach, the foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) approach or the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.
Although most attention has been devoted to capital adequacy set out in Pillar 1, the two remaining pillars are believed to be of even greater importance (The Economist, 2004) . The second pillar (Pillar 2, "Supervisory Review") grants regulatory discretion to national supervisory authorities to tweak regulatory capital levels, e.g. they may impose additional capital charges for risk exposures they deem insufficiently covered in Pillar 1. Pillar 2 also includes the requirement of banks to develop internal processes to assess their overall capital adequacy commensurate to their risk profile in compliance with supervisory standards and to maintain appropriate capital levels. The third pillar (Pillar 3, "Market Discipline") compels banks to disclose more information to financial markets under the objective of strengthening their market discipline and transparent risk management practices (Basle Committee, 2003 to hold regulatory capital for positions of securitisation transactions. In a nod to previous regulatory advances the Second Consultative Paper proffers the adoption of ratings-based risk weightings ("ratings-based approach" (RBA)) for rated tranches (see Tab. 1 below) as a regulatory default risk equivalent to their external rating grade.
Tab. 1. Risk-weights according to the revised "Consultative Package" (2001).
In the case of low-risk, unrated tranches (e.g. in private placements) or guarantees, the Basle
Committee introduced the so-called "look-through approach" for the calculation of the capital charge. This approach requires that the unrated most senior position of a transaction will receive the average risk-weight that would otherwise be assigned to all securitised credit exposures in underlying portfolio (subject to supervisory review), whilst all subsequent, less senior tranches (mezzanine classes but also second loss facilities and other similar structural enhancements)
should be accorded a 100% risk-weighting. An originating bank (but also a sponsoring or even an investing bank) might provide a first or second loss position as credit support (credit enhancement). 7, 8 For instance, the originating bank commonly retains a first loss piece as the most junior unrated tranche. Any first loss position would be fully deducted from the capital 7 Under the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation the originating bank would need to deduct the notional amount of the first loss position directly from its capital stock. Thus, if a sponsoring bank, for instance, accepts a credit enhancement for first losses in the amount of €5m out for a €100m transaction, a full capital deduction (which implies a risk-weighting of 1250%) reflects the capital loss in case of default. However, any additional loss protection is viewed as a direct credit substitute with a 100% risk weighting, provided that a sufficient and significant level of first loss protection is being provided. Hence, a second loss provision of €10m on top of a first loss protection of €5m would incur a further capital charge of €0.8m. 8 The Basle Committee (2002b) defines credit enhancement as a contractual arrangement [,] in which the bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added protection to other parties to the transaction. [...] ." According the current regulatory framework, the optimal structure of securitisation transactions would avoid a first loss piece altogether, so there would be no specific credit enhancement for the most junior tranche. Consequently, the degree of the credit enhancement needed also proxies for the discrepancy of standardised minimum capital requirements and the issuer's own assessment of adequate risk provision for a certain quality of the reference portfolio to be securitised. However, if the provision of a so-called "first loss piece" cannot be avoided, the issuers follow the objective of setting credit enhancement levels as low as possible. Although credit enhancement is commonly derived from internal sources, i.e. they may be generated from the assets themselves, it can take a wide range of external forms, which includes third-party guarantees, letters of credit from highly-rated banks, reserve funds, first and second loss provisions and cash collateral accounts, which have overtaken letters of credit as the method of choice for major public transactions. base, whilst a second loss facility entails an adjustment after it has been valued on an arm's length basis in line with normal credit approval and review processes. The latter is considered to be a credit substitute with a 100% risk-weighting.
Risk weighting
The restrictive use of the look-through approach to most senior positions in securitisation transactions implicitly requires but investing banks (and not issuer) to be effectively exposed to risk arising from securitised exposures (otherwise they would be assigned a standard risk-weight of 100%). According paragraph 527 of the First Consultative Paper the following conditions need to be satisfied for the look through approach to be applicable:
(i) rights on the underlying assets are held either directly by investors or by an independent trustee 9 on their behalf or by a mandated representative;
(ii) in the case of a direct claim, the holder of the securities has an undivided pro rata ownership interest in the underlying assets, i.e. the underlying assets are subject to proportional rights of investors, whilst the SPV must not have any liabilities unrelated to the transaction; high quality assets from their balance sheet would require regulatory action to prevent banks from assuming a higher risk profile at the same regulatory charge. Hence, the Basle Committee gave more credence to a model-based method of deriving risk-weights for unrated tranches.
Regulatory distinction between credit support and liquidity support in securitisation programmes and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits
The notion of sponsoring or managing banks includes the administration of securitisation programmes or asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, where credit exposures from different banks and/or small business creditors are pooled in a securitised reference portfolio.
These conduits typically tend to feature an integrated liquidity support mechanism by sponsoring banks (either programme-wide or pool-specific). Such a contractually fixed commitment to lend on part of the sponsoring or managing bank attracts risk-weightings depending on its maturity.
While a short-term agreement to lend is converted with a 0% risk-weighting, any long-term agreement is treated as a direct credit substitute, and, thus, attracts a 100% risk-weighting.
Moreover, as one of several special provisions concerning such off-balance sheet exposures, the First Working Paper addresses mounting concern over the regulatory treatment of liquidity facilities to asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) as credit enhancement without any clear-cut practical distinction of credit support and liquidity support being put in place. Consequently, the Basle Committee has established a set of essential criteria to conceptually distinguish liquidity support from credit support:
(i) a facility, fixed in time and duration, must provided to the SPV, not to investors, which is subject to usual banking procedures and, at regular banking terms, subject to usual banking procedures,
(ii) the SPV must have the option at its disposal to seek credit support from elsewhere, (iii) the terms of the facility must be established on grounds of a clear identification in what circumstances it might be drawn, ruling out the utilisation of the facility neither as a provider of credit support, as a source of permanent revolving funding nor as cover for sustained asset losses,
(iv) the facility should include a contractual provision (on the basis of a reasonable asset quality test) to either prevent a drawing from being used to cover deteriorated or defaulted assets or to reduce or terminate the facility for a specified decline in asset quality, and (v) the payment of the fee for the facility should not be further subordinated or subject to a waiver or deferral, while the drawings under the facility should not be subordinated to the interests of the note holders.
If the above-mentioned criteria hold, liquidity support as a contingent commitment for future lending draws a 20% conversion factor. Otherwise the liquidity facility will qualify as a credit enhancement, which would be treated no different than an investment in a securitisation transaction with a risk-weighting based on either internal or external ratings. So a back-of-theenvelope calculation of a liquidity facility for a partly-supported ABCP conduit of €100m (of which €50m have already been drawn) would require a capital charge of €50m+(€100m- 
Revolving asset securitisation
In most revolving asset securitisation transactions, the SPV advances funds to the originating bank in the form of revolving credit in return for the receipt of periodic repayments from a pool of outstanding loans this refinancing arrangement allows the originator continue to generate. 10 At the same time, the SPV refinances itself by issuing commoditised structured claims as debt securities to capital market investors. These revolving securitisation structures are frequently supplemented by early amortisation triggers, which force an early wind-down of repayment of principal and interest to investors in the event of an significant deterioration of securitised portfolio value due to higher than expected levels of debtor delinquency and/or loan termination. However, in the case of a sudden drop in the cash flow position of the underlying reference portfolio the originator could be denied a timely withdrawal of revolving credit from the SPV. Early amortisation compels the SPV to use cash flows from securitised loans to pay down investors instead of revolving the amount back to the originator, because the originator's claim in appropriating collections in replenishing the collateral portfolio is subordinated to the payment claims of investors.
Although early amortisation functions like credit support to the benefit of investors, the Basle
Committee considers such a mechanism potential hazardous to proper cash flow allocation if 10 See also Grill and Perczynski (1993) for a more detailed description.
early amortisation is triggered in the context of revolving asset securitisation transactions. Hence, if a transaction includes an "amortisation trigger" the First Working Paper on Asset Securitisation set forth that the notional amount of the securitised asset pool is to be regarded a credit equivalent and charged with a minimum 10% conversion factor for the off-balance sheet piece of the reference portfolio, which may be increased by national regulatory authorities depending on their assessment of various operational requirements. Once a traditional (true sale) and synthetic securitisation meets these requirements the securitised exposures are subject to a regulatory treatment pursuant to the securitisation framework. 14 Under the securitisation framework both originating and investing banks are required to provide a regulatory capital charge for the risk-weighted assets of securitised exposures held. 15
The Second Working
13 Only equities listed in main indices are eligible for the simple approach of operational criteria that qualify for eligible collateral in synthetic securitisation. The comprehensive approach allows for all equities to be considered. 14 Note that the securitisation framework does not cover implicit support mechanisms, such as moral recourse. 15 Generally, in § §521-524 the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord stipulates that banks are required to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitisation exposures arising from (i) the provision of credit risk mitigants to securitisation transactions, such as investments in asset-backed securities, (ii) the retention of subordinated tranches, and (iii) the extension of liquidity facilities or credit enhancements. In case of capital deduction for securitisation exposures, banks are required to provide appropriate regulatory capital by taking 50% from Tier 1 capital and 50% from Tier 2 capital -except for regulatory provisions of any expected future margin income, which would need to be deducted from Tier 1 capital (Basle Committee, 2003) . 
Tab. 2. Risk-weighting (standardised approach).
16 K IRB is the ratio of (a) the IRB capital requirement for the underlying exposures in the securitised pool to (b) the notional or loan equivalent amount of exposures in the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts plus undrawn commitments). 
Rating Grades
The standardised approach does not distinguish between originators and investors in securitisation, whereas third-party (non bank) investors are treated differently. Analogous to the standardised approach of ordinary credit exposures the basic procedure the risk-weighting of individual claims (in the context of securitisation, read securitised claims or tranches) is determined by the external rating (see Tab. 2). The risk-weights for securitised claims are based on the long-term rating of the securitisation products and decrease in a higher rating grade (similar to "regular" claims, categorised by the type of debtor, e.g. sovereigns, banks 17 and corporates). These risk-weights are further distinguished by the type of underlying exposure, i.e. retail portfolios (individual and SME claims), residential property (residential mortgages) and commercial real estate (commercial mortgages). Whereas unrated securitisation exposures with a non-investment grade (external) rating (i.e. below "BBB-") are deducted from capital by issuers ( § §529 and 530 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord), 18 the unrated most senior tranche of a securitisation transaction would be subject to a socalled look-through treatment, i.e. the risk-weight is determined by the average risk-weighting of the underlying credits. However, as illustrated in Tab. 2, the capital charges of securitised claims (esp.
for non-investment grade tranches) are substantially higher than the charges imposed on corporate and bank credits with the same rating. 19
Internal ratings-based approach (IRB) for securitisation exposures
The IRB approach extends the standardised approach along two dimensions. First, it (i) modifies the external ratings-based assignment of risk-weightings (RWs) of the standardised approach by controlling for tranche size, maturity and granularity of securitisation tranches (ratings-based approach (RBA); see Tab. 2) 20 and (ii) introduces the supervisory formula approach (SFA) as an internal-ratings based (IRB) measure to allow for more regulatory flexibility of issuers (and investors) with more sophisticated credit risk management capabilities, which would otherwise not be accounted for in the standardised approach. 17 The risk-weights for banks break down into two options: (i) risk-weighting on the country the bank is incorporated (Option 1) or (ii) risk-weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank (Option 2). Moreover, claims on banks with an original maturity of three months or less would receive a risk-weighting that is one category more favourable. 18 Similarly, securitisation exposures in second loss positions do not have to be deducted if the first loss position (most junior tranche) provides enough protection ( § §529 and 532 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord). Third-party (non-bank) investors may recognise external ratings up to "BB+" to "BB-" for risk-weighting purposes of securitisation exposures, i.e. capital deduction for securitised claims applies only for rating grades of "B+" and lower. 19 The (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord also proposes specific risk-weightings according to the type of underlying exposure: (i) claims included in regulatory retail portfolios (75% risk-weighting), i.e. exposures to individuals (e.g. credit card debt, auto loans, personal finance) or SMEs with low granularity (e.g. single obligor concentration must not be higher than 0.2% of overall regulatory retail portfolio) and low individual exposure (i.e. maximum counterparty exposure not higher than €1 million); (ii) claims secured by residential property (35% risk-weighting); and (iii) claims secured by commercial real estate (100% risk-weighting). 20 Hence, both the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) allow for qualifying external ratings and various operational criteria (see §525 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord 23 The Basle Committee defines IRB K as the ratio of (i) the IRB-based capital requirements including the EL portion for the underlying reference portfolio of securitised assets to (ii) the exposure amount of the "exposure amount of the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts related to securitised exposures plus the EAD [exposure-at-default] associated with undrawn commitments related to securitised exposures (Basle Committee, 2002a) ." The IRB-based capital requirements have to be calculated in accordance with the IRB approach for credit risk as if the securitised exposures were continued to be held by the originating bank, mainly because it reflects the beneficial effect of any credit risk mitigant applied to the underlying reference portfolio on all of the securitised exposures. 24 See Appendix 6.1 for the definition of the effective total number of exposures N and the average lossgiven-default (LGD). 25 Note that whenever a bank holds proportional interest in a tranche, the capital charge for this position equals a commensurate proportion of the capital charge of the entire tranche. 26 See Appendix 6.2 for the specification of the "supervisory formula" (SF) and the "credit enhancement level" L. 27 i.e. the capital charge that would have been applied to the underlying exposures had they not been securitised. 28 The IAA only applies to exposures with an internal rating equivalent of investment-grade at inception. 1: Investing banks need to seek supervisory approval for inclusion in this category of regulatory capital treatment, whereas originating banks automatically fall into this category. 2: The application of the Simplified SFA in lieu of the SFA is also subject to supervisory approval. 3: Under the IRB approach the term "rated" refers to positions with an external rating or an inferred rating. 4: The IAA permits originating banks to used RBA for exposures to ABCP conduits, where the internal rating equivalent represents an investment grade/rating.
Amendments to the Third Consultative
Tab. 3. The new securitisation framework (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b).
Changes during the third consultative phase towards a revised securitisation framework also include a closer alignment of the RBA-based risk-weights to the actual riskiness of securitised positions with a high external or inferred rating (as well as low-risk exposures to ABCP where the IAA applies). The proposed measure moves the focus of assigning the lowest set of risk-weights for investment grade ratings away from the "thickness" (as in the (Third) Consultative Paper) to the level of seniority of exposures with little or no loss of risk sensitivity at the cost of disqualifying some granular tranches from the use of the most preferential risk-weights (see Tab. 4). 29 Separate risk-weights are assigned to (i) senior, granular tranches, (ii) non-senior, granular tranches ("base case") and (iii) tranches backed by non-granular pools. The change of eligibility for the preferential risk-weights is also accompanied by a more fine-tuned differentiation of risk-weights for different levels of investment grade-rated positions, so as to simplify the RBA framework.
29 Generally, the working paper on Changes to the Securitisation Framework defines the term "senior tranche" in context of RBA as a position that is "effectively backed or secured by a first claim on the entire amount of the assets in the underlying securitised pool." Although this definition may only apply to the most senior position within a securitisation transaction, "in some instances there may be some other claim that, in a technical sense, may be more senior in the waterfall (e.g. a swap claim) but will be disregarded for the purpose of determining which positions are subject to the 'senior tranches' column (Basle Committee, 2004a The "old" RBA risk weights according to the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitsation (2002) have been added in parenthesis. Note the change of the qualification criteria for the most preferential risk weights from "highly granular tranches" to "senior tranches". 1: The most preferential risk weights are also assigned to unrated low-risk positions subject to IAA unless a liquidity facility or credit enhancement constituted a mezzanine position in economic substance, which would render applicable the "base case" applicable in this situation. Committee, 2004a and 2004b) . 30 Generally, the regulatory risk-weightings for unrated positions (including liquidity facilities and credit enhancements extended to ABCP conduits, which are not captured by the IAA) in securitisation transactions continue to be based on a modified Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA), which, in its initial version, was considered unnecessarily complex (see Appendix 6.2). However, the so-called Simplified Supervisory Formula ("Simplified SF") as an alternative calculation to the existing Supervisory Formula (SF) of the (Third) Consultative Paper in order to ease some the computational burden involved in the old SF. 32 However, the Simplified SF did not find entry in 30 The "mark-up" of risk-weights on securitisation tranches can be illustrated by comparing the IRB riskweights per se for an underlying asset class, e.g. residential mortgages and corporate loans, with the riskweights imposed on securitisation claims. The difference is the greatest especially for low investment grade ratings (e.g. "A", "Baa1" and "Baa2"). At the same time, the Basle Committee rejects further decomposition of risk-weights into portions of unexpected loss (UL) and expected loss (EL) in the bid to increase risk sensitivity of the securitisation framework due to the current definition of IRB K as the sum of UL and EL portions of on-balance sheet credit risk exposures. Since the EL tends to be relatively small compared to UL for senior securitisation positions the existing capital requirements are treated as fully representing capital against UL for investment grade-rated positions and unrated positions above IRB K . Conversely, in the case of unrated positions that fall below IRB K or are rated non-investment grade, full deduction of the notional tranche amount appears sufficiently adequate to account for the changing proportions of EL and UL in declining seniority of securitised exposures. risk transfer in a securitisation transaction to ensure integrity of the securitisation framework between securitised and unsecuritised exposures within the overall revision of the capital requirements of the new Basle Accord.
Tab. 4. The new long-term and short-term RBA risk-weights (Basle
CASE STUDY: THE OPTIMISATION OF REGULATORY CAPITAL
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards ("Basle 2") presents a consistent securitisation framework, which all but eliminates possibilities of regulatory arbitrage through securitisation due to both (i) a more risk-sensitive computation of the capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposures and (ii) a close alignment of capital requirements of securitised exposures and non-securitised credit exposures. The following illustration of capital requirements for different structures of securitisation transactions (see Tab. 4) relies on the latter aspect of regulatory change implicated in the new Basle Accord not to be fully met, i.e. the new Basle Accord would elicit different capital charges for non-securitised and securitised exposures of similar credit risk.
While the mitigation of overall regulatory capital requirements cannot be deemed the single most important motivation for securitisation, one needs to attest to regulatory optimisation defining importance in the way issuers devise and advance securitisation techniques to transfer asset exposures to capital markets until the new Basle Accord comes into effect in 2006. Especially, the migration from conventional (true sale) securitisation techniques to synthetic transaction types marks the effort of optimising regulatory capital relief by means of clearly defined investment risk.
Assuming that under the existing Basle Accord on-balance sheet credit exposures translate into 100% risk-weighted assets (RWA), which draw a standard capital charge of 8% ("capital ratio") on their notional amount. Hence, any arrangement that yields minimum capital requirement for securitised exposures of less than 8% under simplifying assumptions would attest to regulatory optimisation through asset securitisation. 34
Tab. 4. Effects of transaction structure on the regulatory capital requirement of securitised credit risk.
The different degrees of reduced regulatory capital requirements of securitised credit risk exposure can be best illustrated on the basis of the disparate configurations of transaction structures commonly used in loan securitisation. Under the most straightforward transaction type of conventional securitisation, the asset originator completes an outright asset sale to an SPV, which issues senior and mezzanine debt securities (notes) to capital market investors, where the originator retains a first loss position (FLP) as commitment device to mitigate default risk. In the first transaction type of Tab. 4 (traditional/true sale structure) we assume investor notes to amount to 96% of the transaction volume (with 92% senior notes and 4% mezzanine notes) and an FLP of 4% relative notional value. After completion of off-balance sheet refinancing through a true sale securitisation, a bank originator would have cut its regulatory capital requirement by half, as it is now required to hold equity of only 4% of the securitised reference portfolio (according to 100% risk weighting of outstanding liabilites from the retention of FLP).
The fully funded synthetic equivalent of this form of asset risk transfer (with a SPV) may even further reduce minimum capital requirements. For the same portfolio quality the associated loss If asset originators and/or issuers should decide to offer the FLP to capital market investors as well in the bid to further reduce capital requirements, they would do so by underwriting a socalled interest sub-participation agreement as credit enhancement of the FLP as the most junior tranche of the transaction (Böhringer et al., 2001) . The interest sub-participation replaces the full capital deduction of FLP at a capital ratio of 8% and 100% risk weighting (see Tab. 4). In the event of default loss interest sub-participation requires the issuer to compensate any losses 35 i.e. the aggregate loss of securitised loans after the enforcement of collateral used to secure these loans. 36 Synthetic transactions come in various structures of security design, which can be specified along three major dimensions: (i) level of funding: unfunded, (fully) funded or partially funded, (ii) involvement of a SPV as issuing agent (indirect or direct securitisation), (iii) degree of collateralisation of funded elements (with or without collateral, e.g. government bonds, guarantees, letter of credit, certificate of indebtedness, Pfandbriefe). 
RESUME: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY GOVERNANCE OF ASSET SECURITISATION
The pathological evolution of the securitisation framework under the revised Basle Accord reflects the successive steps the Basle Committee has taken over time in the bid to eliminate arbitrage opportunities from credit securitisation under existing provisions for the regulatory treatment of credit risk under the old 1988 Basle Accord and later amendments.
Prior to the recent agreement on new capital standards for credit risk, securitisation techniques remedied the glaring incompatibility between the regulatory capital charge and the actual economic cost of credit risk across the spectrum of varying rating grades (i.e. regulatory "mispricing" of credit risk). In absence of risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements for credit exposures and little regulatory guidance as to how banks should compute their capital charge for securitised exposures, asset securitisation has been labelled a sensible market reaction to inefficient regulatory governance of credit risk in the banking system. So from a regulatory perspective, securitisation is essentially a child of its own making due to anomalies in the regulatory system giving rise to regulatory arbitrage. Needless to say, this use of securitisation aroused concern among regulators about the troubling prospect of (i) an insufficient provision of minimum capital requirements to absorb actual default loss due to and (ii) an inadequate treatment of unexpected risk. As regards the latter aspect, regulators specifically worried about the absorption of unexpected losses by more senior tranches held by capital market investors in the event of financial shocks, while originators hold merely some concentrated risk exposure of expected losses in the form of a junior claim as first loss position.
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards
("Basle 2") all but purges the possibility of regulatory arbitrage through securitisation along two dimensions. One the one hand, the capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposure has been made more risk-sensitive, and, on the other hand, the regulatory treatment of securitisation transactions has been closely aligned to match the capital requirements for non-securitised credit exposures. 38 In anticipation of imminent regulatory change, 39 asset securitisation appears to longer deserve the now-hackneyed moniker of a pure (regulatory) arbitrage tool, flaunting the gap between internal default provisions for default loss and external risk assessment methods of riskweighted assets by offering "regulatory overcharged asset holdings/exposures" to capital market investors.
With the arbitrage paradigm of securitisation giving way to an envisaged reconciliation of economic and regulatory incentives, the role of securitisation as an efficient mechanism of reducing asset exposure to optimise overall regulatory capital charge looks distinctly uncertain.
This development begs the question of whether the fundamental economic rationale of asset securitisation remains viable. However, in spite of regulatory changes underway securitisation markets betray no hint of visible signs of change. The popularity of asset securitisation continues unfettered and seems to suggest that securitisation seems to be principally motivated by the economic benefit of issuers to convert illiquid assets into tradable debt securities in the effort to economise on a predefined level of acceptable first loss risk exposure.
Additionally, empirical evidence about financial innovation in transaction structures over the recent past testifies to the adaptability and systemic flexibility in asset securitisation markets.
38 Giddy (1997) proffers a new approach to the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation in his definition of "perimeters of bank regulation in securitisation". According to his view, the goal ought to be that the substance and not the form of the asset transfer is what governs capital requirements. Giddy notes in this respect that regulatory authorities may access capital or reserve requirements as if the financing was a secured borrowing in cases when the transfer of assets/asset risk (i) leaves the issuer open to recourse deemed risky by the authorities, and/or (ii) entails the potential for moral hazard, whereby a bank shores up potential or actual losses arising from the securitised exposures in order to protect its name even when not legally required to do so. 39 The new proposals for the revision of the Basle Accord remedy this shortcoming through the implementation of discriminatory risk-weightings across rating categories. Under this so-called "ratingsbased approach" (RBA) risk weights will be more closely aligned to loan grades in the loan book. If the broad-brushed regulatory treatment of loans disappears, banks will increasingly resort to non-investment loan assets to support their securitisation transaction, and by doing so, they will put a premium on the adequate allocation of first loss provision as credit enhancement. Consequently, the incentive to securitise non-investment grade loans adds topical significance to the issue of credit enhancement, as the differences between collateral (reference portfolio) quality and desired structured rating is expected to widen in the future.
Although loan securitisation has become a routine procedure of structured finance, with informed investors have grown familiar with its structural characteristics, it has preserved sufficient flexibility to absorb regulatory change. Hence, loan securitisation in its current state is not a permanent account of efforts to achieve marketability of credit exposures but an example of structured finance of its age (when regulatory arbitrage was possible), with properties that fed on the absence of a fair internal ratings-based determination of loan default risk. The current regulatory reform simply inaugurates another round of innovation in security design of loan securitisation. If advocates of securitisation pin their colours to the economic benefits, this makes this argument even more compelling and imminent. However, as risk-sensitive bank capital charges eliminate the regulatory capital arbitrage paradigm of securitisation, the security design of asset-backed securities can only be sufficiently accommodating of these regulatory changes if the arguments of risk management and efficient asset funding as fundamental economic reasons for securitisation do indeed hold.
In a nutshell, it is fair to say that supervisory responsiveness of the Basle Committee to the accretion of structured finance has led to a more risk sensitive securitisation framework of the agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, which has all but eliminated the optimisation of regulatory capital as an incentive of credit risk transfer through securitisation. Nonetheless, the persistent discrepancy of the regulatory of similar securitised exposures under the standardised approach and IRB approach, on the one hand, and between minimum capital requirements for credit risk and securitised positions remains a source continued concern. Given the significant cost of synthetic securitisation, the relationship between security design and the economic cost of securitised exposures as well as derivative elements will become more prominent considerations in structured finance transactions and warrant further regulatory progression.
Appendix 1: Definition of the effective number of exposures and loss-given default
The effective number of exposures (N) and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default LGD denotes the average loss-given-default of all exposures to the ith obligor. 41 The thickness of exposures (T) is defined as the ratio of (i) the nominal size k C of tranche k to (ii) the notional amount of securitised exposures C in the underlying reference
Appendix 2: Definition of the supervisory formula (SF) and the credit enhancement level
The "supervisory formula" (SF) ( ) . S is defined as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
The credit enhancement level (L) is measured (in decimal form) as the ratio of (i) the amount of all securitised positions subordinate to tranche k to (ii) the notional amount of all securitised exposures, which could also expressed as 42
[ [ . 42 According to the Basle Committee banks will be required to determine the level of credit enhancement prior to any consideration of effects of any tranche-specific credit enhancements, such as third-party guarantees, which might benefit a single tranche only. Further stipulations exclude any gains-on-sale from the computation of the level of credit enhancement, whereas interest rate and currency swaps more junior than tranche k may be only be considered at their current value or be ignored otherwise. 43 
Appendix 4: Definition of the simplified supervisory formula (Simplified SF) "Changes to the Securitisation Framework" (2004)
The Simplified Supervisory Formula ("Simplified SF") fundamentally relies on slicing securitisation exposures into infinitesimally thin tranches ("ITTs") and combines the 
